Attempts to define information go back to the 1940s and continue up to today w ith little, if any, consensus. Wellisch analyzed thirty-nine pre-1970 definitions of information science (IS), finding only eight of them based on the definition of information itself. "Yet even the eight valiant definers of 'information' as the central concept with which IS is concerned do not succeed to arrive at an agreed-upon definition, nor do their definitions have any common elements . . . "2 Schrader's extensive dissertation on the definition of library and information science ident ified 134 synonyms used for the term 'information', thus illustrating "the multiplicity of vague, contradictory, and sometimes bizarre notions of the nature of information."3 Some of these synonyms are cited later in this essay.
Early definitions provided by Hayes are closely related to the theme of this book. He made a distinction between data ("anything recorded in a form which can be processed"), information ("the result of processing data"), knowledge ("accumulated data, wh ich has been systematized, formulated, and evaluated") and wisdom ("subjective, ethical, judgmental")4 He defined information science as "the study of information-producing processes in any information system in which they may occur."5 Library is one such system, and "information science is becoming an integral part of library education, an increasingly important part of the librarian's professional and operational responsibility, and a part of the theoretical foundat ions of librarianship."6
The lack of agreement on the basic concept of information within Information Science brings into question its scientific status (Yovitz, 1969). Fairthorne (1965) called for abandoning the term 'information' altogether. Vagianos (1972) considered the unpredictability of the transition from data through knowledge to wisdom as the reason for lack of a satisfactory definition of information. In a more optimistic vein, Diener argued that "be cause information is so fundamental to sociality (it is ubiquitous to all human and societal interaction), we need to develop our own general and specific theories, hypotheses, research methodologies, and units of measure."7
10.2 Information-Knowledge Relationships
10.2.1 Introduction
A lack of agreed definition of 'information' among librarians and information scientists leads to a considerable confusion about the relationships between the co ncepts of 'information' and 'knowledge'. It is suggested that conventionally understood information and knowledge are different stages of the same continuous process, in which an individual integrates newly perceived data into the already existing system of 'relations known,' linking together data previously comprehended, and thus expanding the scope of that person's understanding.
Separately, information describing data and knowledge comprehending their meaning are neither similar nor mutually exclusive autonomous concepts; but together, both are the components of data-information-knowledge processes. An awareness of the universe around us consists of relating perceptions of various aspects of that universe into some integrated patterns.
Information is considered in this chapter as a shorthand term for a description of a cluster of perceptions brought to our attention, but not yet fully assimilated. Knowledge is perceived as a state, at any particular time, of 'relations known' t hat are expressed in a system of knowing that has been already acquired by an individual. The new 'knowledge' is always a result of an individual's own subjective series of data-information-knowledge transformations, and not a product of some external, objective knowledge, unaltered and transmitted in toto from outside sources.
Following the overall theme of this book, I distinguish among three different levels of interpreting knowledge by reviewing the concept in empirical, contextual, and conc eptual contents. On the empirical level, knowledge is described by reference to the linguistic conventions; it deals with rules governing a given process and its representation by a static, figurative meaning of knowledge, expressed in symbols such as the printed message.
The contextual definition of knowledge is prescriptive, addressing the most effective use of actual empirical experiences. It is hospitable to concept of 'operative' knowledge, Ryle's (1949) 'know-how' to act in a given situ ation, and 'knowing how-to' do things efficiently. It refers to specific knowledge in a specific context; one becomes knowledgeable about things by an actual acquaintance with them (Russell, 1912) and by understanding their observable causal relations.
The conceptual notion of knowledge accepts a platonic focus on the essence of things, ideas, and forms, and the explanations of their meanings. The knowledge that something is true is intuitive or it is inferred from either logically or empiricall y established relations.
The former, intuitive approach assumes the existence of knowledge independently of the human mind. The latter, rational approach implies that knowledge is a system of relations as they are perceived by an individual. The argument of this essay rests on the rational concept of knowledge. In all cases, knowledge is an idea, an abstraction which is open-ended, constantly changing in terms of newly acquired understanding of relations among different aspects of realit y.
10.2.2 Contemporary Interpretation of Information-Knowledge Relationships
Depending on the definitions of information and knowledge, the definition of relationships between these two concepts stretches from identity to mutual exclusivity. As identical or very similar in meaning, the two concepts are often used as nouns, standing for a content of a message. For example, the statement defining information as a raw datum and knowledge as organized data implies that since data are essential components of both information and knowledge, the two concepts complement each other. Identity or near similarity is also implied by definitions such as 'information is knowledge of facts,' 'knowledge is processed information,' or 'information is a coded fact that can be stored, retrieved, and transferred.'
Those definitions suggest that information and knowledge are of the same kind, knowledge being considered as a more developed form of information. It follows, then, that in formation is knowledge, hence, both information and knowledge can be identified by observation, retrieved by a librarian, or processed by a computer. It also suggests that knowledge resides in an environment independent of human beings, and that it must be discovered by humans in order to be perceived.
The opposite view, defining information and knowledge as mutually exclusive terms, or maintaining that they reflect at least two basically different notions, implied that the process of relatin g the two terms to each other results in a total change of one concept (information) into another (knowledge). Here the two terms are used as verbs, emphasizing the process of transference itself rather than the content of the transfer. This approach raises the issue of relevance in transferring 'something in information' into something else in knowledge.
A definition of information as data about matter determined empirically and of knowledge as the philosophically inferred essence of that ma tter illustrates a view of a mutually exclusive meaning of information and knowledge. For example, Boorstin (1982) maintains that an examination of certain characteristics of a book may identify the type of knowledge that distinguishes it from information. Such a view assumes that not all information is knowledge, and that knowledge has to be created by human beings. The two concepts are not the same; they may supplement but not substitute for each other.
Still another view is expressed by Mach lup (1980), who takes a position in between the two just described. He states that information and knowledge, considered as parts of a content, are synonyms, while when information represents a process and knowledge a content of that process, the two terms are perceived as antonyms. All approaches summarized above illustrate synecdochic problems created by considering only some selected characteristics of information and knowledge within an all-inconclusive definition-- that is, by comparing or contras ting specific characteristics of one concept with the singled-out characteristics of the other.
In both cases of comparing or contrasting those characteristics, the totality of the meaning of the process or the content of the total knowledge is overlooked.
For example, Machlup's definition refers to information and knowledge as parts of the same general content, but not as the same parts of that content. Synecdochic misunderstanding may result in a false expectation. Thus, when i nformation is identified with knowledge, learning about some external manifestation of phenomena is equated with understanding their total meaning. Or, when information and knowledge are considered different, but related by learning concepts, it is implied that data possess some mysterious power of directly changing acquired facts into understanding.
Information cannot be identified with knowledge, because it is only a specific or selected description of relation within the total knowledge, deve loped at a particular time by a given individual. Similarly, information cannot be considered unrelated to knowledge, since it itself is always a part of the total relations known. Finally, both concepts are always referring to a continuous relationship among newly acquired information (i.e., data) and static, at that time, knowledge (i.e., relations known).
FIG 10-1: Schematic definition of relations known.8
In Figur e 10-1, knowledge is defined in terms of relationships among empirical descriptions of observations, contextual, psychological perceptions, and conceptual, philosophical interpretations of data. The relationships between any two of the three approaches reflect different definitions of knowledge, as either propositional or pragmatic or as belief statements about reality. Thus, the process relates perceived data to the conceptual understanding of those relations.
The interdependence illustrated in the diagram offers some clarification, discussed elsewhere in this essay, of the dispute between materialistic and idealistic theories of librarianship by incorporating, within the definition of knowledge, the two opposite concepts of Wright's (1977) telus ('know-why,' a deductive theoretical process of thinking) and mechus ('know-how', an inductive empirical process of experimental knowledge).
The diagram also points to the role of belief in the definition of relations known. The beli ef becomes a part of that relation if it is verified by empirical evidence and if its meaning is explained in terms of the total relations known.
Belief considered alone as a psychological perception and/or unverified conceptual explanation is not a part of the relations actually known and is not discussed in this essay.
10.3 The Case of a Misplaced Descriptor
The foregoing discussion points to a major conceptual problem created by a lack of clearly defined notion o f information, on which various theories of knowledge are formulated. In this section, I attempt to bridge different interpretations of 'information' by suggesting a model hospitable to many of them. To accomplish this, I demythologize the concept of information by suggesting a common denominator for its various definitions. Information is here considered a descriptor of clusters of data. Unique to each information is the process of identifying specific relationships between different characteristics of d ata.
10.3.1 The Argument
Information is not an entity. It is a description of the group of characteristics (data) of that entity. In the summary of his review of the concepts of information for information science, Belkin cited several definitions of information defined as: a fundamental category such as matter; a property of matter; structure or organization; the probability of the occurrence of an event; reduction in the degree of uncertainty in a state of knowledge (or similar construct); an event that takes place when a recipient encounters a text; data of value in decision-making; public, communicated scientific information; and the message itself.9
None was fully satisfactory to him then, and all are rejected in this essay as definitions of information, considered instead as descriptions of data. 10 As such these definitions make sense within the s cope of the universe they describe. The more detailed the description, the better the understanding of the reality under consideration.
Is this merely a semantic argument? Yes, if the focus is on the terminology alone. No, if the distinction is made between the entities reflecting given aspects of reality and the data that identify these entities, their properties and their description, by specifying in more detail the aspects of the reality considered, the role of the characteristics selected, and the way they are described.
Simply stated, it is suggested that the term 'information', as often cited in the literature, is a misnomer. It should be replaced in most cases, with the term 'data'. Each term stands for specific characteristics of reality, with the term 'information' reserved for the description of the relations between these characteristics. So interpreted, the term 'information' can be understood as an umbrella concept for a variety of descriptions of reali ty. Each description is subject to its own verification, thus making a distinction between the understanding reality, its records and its interpretations.
10.3.2 Definitions11
10.3.2.1 Reality
Reality is that which exists independently of thoughts and ideas about it and from which all other things, ideas, and events derive; it forms a basic matter of the universe, its substance. It is the fundamental state or quality that makes d ata what they are. In semantic definitions, reality stands for elements of a subject that refer to place, person, thing, state, or qualities.
10.3.2.2 Data
Each datum [a noun] is a specific characteristic of a selected aspect of the universe. It is an attribute or quality of an object, or an event that always characterizes it but does not enter into its definition. It is that which is given: in epistemology, an actual element presented to mind; in psychology, the con tent of sensations, an intrinsic character or attribute of a conscious experience; in logic, that from which inferences may be drawn. A datum can be either given, perceived, or interpreted and considered as a form of activities, processes, changes, or products, or as a phenomenon, such as linguistic structure. Each kind of data can be analyzed empirically as a mechanical part of the universe considered as a total machine; contextually within a given socio-psychological context, or abstractl y as a relationship between observed, actual, and logical ideas.
10.3.2.3 Infoscription
To infoscribe [a verb] is a process of describing data as an activity, its product, or a phenomenon which is perceived at a given time and in a given space; and it is also a process of interpreting the relationships between activities, products, and phenomena on specific levels: bio-physical, socio-psychological, or metaphysical. Infoscription is in fact a major subject for the study of Information Science.
10.3.2.4 Information
The results of infoscription are infoscripts; the clusters of infoscripts become 'information' [nouns], recorded descriptors of both the relationships between clusters of data which are given, perceived, or imparted by the mind and/or their status, each reflecting a different subject area seen from a specific viewpoint. Information incorporated into existing system of understanding reality becomes 'knowledge' within that system .
10.3.2.5 Chain of Increased Complexity
Thus reality may be understood on different levels of complexity, starting with the data (characteristics of reality), followed by infoscription (the processes of describing relationships between data within a given universe), leading to the product of infoscription, information (selected clusters of infoscripts), and culminating in knowledge of that reality (infoscribed data incorporated into a given system of relations known) .
Data and their descriptions vary, hence each information is different. Data can be variously classified; one such classification is suggested in the model proposed in this chapter.
10.4 Model for Infoscriptive Processes.
The purpose of the model is to identify basic common denominators for most of the definitions of information cited in the literature, using some definitions of informati on as illustrations for the model.
10.4.1 A Triadic Approach
One can identify a number of different descriptors, each combination of them providing different levels of definitions; the variation will depend on the kind of elements considered. In my model I identify three aspects of realities: the type of data, their characteristics, and the level of interpretation.
| TYPE OF DATA |
Data's Characteristics |
|---|---|
| Levels of Interpretation |
Each of the above aspects of reality can, in turn, be subdivided into a variety of sub-elements. We are focusing here on the simplest matrix, subdividing each aspect into three sub-elements, as shown below.
10.4.2 Infoscriptive Processes
Table 10-2: Types of data, below, describes knowledge in terms of relationships between different kinds of data, characterized as process, product, or phenomenon at three distinctive levels: bio-physical, socio-psychological, and logical.
| DATA | Data's Characteristics | ||
|---|---|---|---|
P1 |
P2 |
P3 | |
|
Unspecified data: Primary Data: Secondary Data: Tertiary Data: |
Interpreted on three levels (L): | ||
|
L1 : Bio-physical, procedural (pd) L2: Socio-psychological, cultural (Cx) L3: Logical, rational (Co) | |||
| KNOWLEDGE | |||
10.4.3 The Co mponents of the Model
10.4.3.1 Data:
a. Assumed data [D]
Assumed data are unspecified, all inclusive, universal, and indispensable data that can be a part of any infoscription. For example, data referred to as synonyms to information: all, basic, broader than, essential, fundamental, intangible, raw data, commodity, entity, fact, form, item, pattern, product, resource.
b. Primary Data (given, constant) [D1]
Primary forms or substa
nces of reality are inherent qualities
(e.g., physical dimensions such as size and shape) which are
inseparable from the objects and give a rise to perceptions
that directly resemble the data as given, physical objects
and systems; such as information's synonyms: brain, carrier,
vehicles, marks, and biological, chemical, neural, factographic, observable processes.
For instance, information [i.e., data] defined "as a
resource to be developed, used, reused, an
d traded as, for
example, water, minerals, land, or power." 12
c. Secondary Data (perceived, variable) [D2]:
Secondary forms or substances are nonphysical qualities, perceived by the senses; they are highly variable, producing
various sensations such as the impact of environment, measure, power, super energy, change, stimulus, discovery,
and transformation. For example, information is perceived in
information science as: "the structure
of any text which is
capable of changing the image-structure of a recipient."13
d. Tertiary Data (ascribed, reactions to experiences) [D3]:
Tertiary forms or substances are imparted by mind concepts,
resulting from a subject's reactions to objects.
Tertiary data can be interpreted:
(1) psychologically, as mentality, cognition, consciousness,
intelligence, thoughts, understanding;
(2) sociologically, as c
ommunication, opinion, culture;
(3) philosophically, as ideas, concepts, meaning, knowledge,
state of knowledge, wisdom;
(4) linguistically, as semantic data;
(5) ethically, as data of value, quality, morality, judg-
ments -- for example, "Information is defined as the
logarithm of the number of choices."14
10.4.3.2 Attributes of Data: Infoscriptive Predicates of Reality
Data predicate the reality; they proclaim, declare, assert, affirm, or deny something of that reality by describing or characterizing the data's attributes. Three such attributes are here identified:
(a) Process [P1]: a purposive action, event, or occurrence leading to specific results. See for example, Wersig and Neveling's definition: "information . . . is a process which occurs within a human mind when a problem and data useful for its solution are brought into productive union";15 or Debons' definition: "information is a process whereby data are received and interpreted by an intelligent being."16
Examples of Schrader's synonyms interpreted as the process synonyms [P1]: to become different, to transform, to have the form, to give structure, to organize; to function as processes and activities: e.g., communicating, decision-making, holding, interacting, maintaining, manipulating, planning, problem- solving, transforming, informing, or altering.
(b) Result of processes or activities [P2], such as: data described as products, a person, an event, or a thing produced by or resulting from a process, a substance obtained from another through chemical and other changes. For example, "Information is the alteration of the image which occurs when it receives a message. Information is thus an event -- an event which occurs at some unique point in time and space, to some particular individual."17
Examples of synonyms for products of processes [P2]: communicated, evaluated, organized, perceived, processed, recorded, reproduced, shared, stored, decay, experience, growth, made, product, productive, activities, combination of increase, increment, reduction, recognition, resolution, transmission, received, used, transferred.
(c) Phenomenon [P3]:
occurrences, observances, conditions, situational connections or mutual influences between two or
more data, such as cause-effect, state of affairs, combination of circumstances, contributions or attributes modifying the facts or events; anything that is not considered a process or its results. For example, Fairthorne notes that information is not an entity: "it is no more than a linguistic convenience," 18
or Otten and Debons (1970) define information as a 'fundamental phenomenon.'
Examples of Schrader's (1983) synonyms interpreted as phenomena [P3]: oc currence, situation, content; ties, links, commodity influence, qualitative and quantitative relations, anomalous, ascribed, circumstance, content, form, kind, meta-energy, potential, reference, relational, representation, subset, summation, symbol, system, useful.
10.4.3.3 Interpretative Levels:
(a) The empirical, procedural level of interpretation [Pd] consists of a description of relations between structural, physical, given data, each functioning as a description of either processes [P1], their products [P2] or phenomena [P3]. They include the factual, mechanistic, biophysical makeup of data and the description of the physical format within the data.
The interpretation itself is phrased in terms of the objective, physical world. It is based on a theory that all phenomena are totally explicable by a mechanistic doctrine which assumes that nature, like a machine, is a whole, whose single functions are served automatically by its parts . The universe is considered as an all inclusive mass-energy system, self-organized, self-regulated, with everything in it as a form (shape, structure, etc.) or as a process (energized capacity to change). The interpretation also has a functional dimension; for example, knowledge is represented in various library activities, such as acquisition, organization, control, storing, and retrieval of library material.
As a procedural theory, it deals with specification of steps to be taken, determi ned by the ends sought and based on empirical evidence, quantitative measurements, and principles abstracted from experience.
It is a scientific world view: predicative, accurate, and economical descriptions, defined in terms of actual operations, statistical inferences, decision theories, logical constructions, and empirical observations. It is represented by philosophical schools such as pragmatism based on a rule of procedure, a technique to find a solution by clarifying the m eaning of signs; or operationalism, stressing the presence of physical entities, processes, and properties identified from their operational verification.
Examples of Schrader's (1983) synonyms used in procedural interpretation of data [Pd]: biophysical, empirical, mass energy mechanism, material, mechanical or production focus, operational interpretation, sensory perception, structural or technical interpretation.
(b) The contextual level of interpretatio n [Cx] consists of data interpreted in terms of the totality of conditions which affect the particular facts or experiences. It is often purpose-related, always based on a particular context.
As a socio-psychological, subjective, environmental, and cultural approach, this interpretation is an expressive, emotive and behavioral description of attitudes toward the data, which are interpreted by the senses. It involves presupposing circumstances or assumptions in a given context, e.g., the statement 'S implies X' is based on the context in which it appears. The contextual approach resembles the perspectives of cultural, philosophical anthropology, which is concerned with the work environment and its cultural sociological aspects. It emphasizes the multiformity of human nature.
Examples of Schrader's (1983) synonyms used in contextual level of interpretation of data [Cx]: socio-psychological, societal, socio-historical, artistic, behavioral, contextual interpretations; cultural, environmental description, exchange between human, experience, human or life focus, objective state, language, focus on people, on person, on recipient, on social issues.
(c) Conceptual level of interpretation [Co] is an ideational interpretation of data in terms of the meaning perceived by the recipient of data; it provides a description of ideas about the data ascribed to them. It is a philosophical abstraction, conceptually described or ex plained. The conceptual approach provides a balance between procedural [Pd] and contextual [Cx] interpretations; through it, the inner world of ideas is described by the laws of physics, perceived psychologically and discovered by reflection on values and beliefs.
Examples of Schrader's (1983) synonyms used in a conceptual interpretation of data [Co]: rational, abstract, analytic, logical, meaningful, relational, scientific, semantic, spiritual, subjective, symbolic, a nd synthetic interpreta- tions.
(d) Variations in the description of data
Dependence of the descriptions of the same data on the level of their interpretation can be illustrated by reviewing, for example, the definition of information as 'reduction of uncertainty." 19
In a given, real world [D1], explained mechanistically [Pd], information is a process of increasing the availability of data [P1] thus reducing uncertainty.
In a subjective, perceived world [D2], described on a subjective, human level [Cx], increased beliefs [P1] reduce doubts.
In an imagined, ascribed world [D3] the meaning [Co] of the proposition 'reduction of uncertainty' is proven by disproving its opposite, the increase of uncertainty.
Hence, at least the following classifications of the definition of 'reduction of uncertainty' are possible:
In a general interpretation of 'reduction of uncertainty' 'D}P1<
/B>':
D stands for unspecified data of uncertainty
In a logical interpretation 'D3}P1:Co':
P1 stands for a process of reducing uncertainty.
D3 stands for conceptual (logical) uncertainty,
In a physical interpretation of reducti
on of uncertainty
about structural stress (e.g., in building design) 'D1}P1:Pd':
P1 stands for a process of reducing uncertainty,
Co stands for a logical interpretation.
D1 stands for given uncertainty
In psychological interpretation of reduction of uncertainty 'D2}P1:Cx':
P1 stands for process of reducing structural stress
Pd stands for physical (mechanical) interpretation.
D2 stands for perceived uncertainty
10.5 Reinterpretation of Library and Information Science Definitions of the Term 'Information'.
P1 stands for
a process of reducing uncertainty
Cx stands for its psychological interpretation.
Selected here are examples of different approaches to the definition of information. They represent physical, linguistic, and metaphysical interpretations of information-related phenomena in library and information science discussed at procedural, contextual and conceptual lev els.20
10.5.1 General Level of Interpretation
10.5.1.2 Otten considers information as the common descriptor for all nonphysical aspects and interactions between and among man, machines, and the universe and as the common denominator for knowledge . . . the descriptor of a concept or phenomenon as fundamental as matter or energy.21 At the same time, however, he also discusses information as a commodity and a process, both interdepe ndent with matter and energy, thus strongly suggesting its material base.
Interpreted in terms of my model, (a) Otten's term 'information' corresponds more closely to my concept of data; (b) his static and dynamic properties ("information stored or contained in something" or "associated with action, with a process,"22 are extended in my model into three properties (P1, P2, P3); and (c) his three levels of information (structural, analytic, and semantic) are discussed by me as different levels of interpretations (Pd, Cx, Co). And finally, Otten's interrelationship between matter, energy, and information is discussed in my model as different types of data (D1, D2, D3).
10.5.1.2 Horowitz (1988) accepted the notion of a tridimensional reality of librarianship, developed by Nitecki (1964) and referenced by Shera (1972), and then considers it "implicit in almost any formulation of the library system."23
In her disc ussion of library curricula, Horowitz proposes her own framework for the theory of librarianship based on a distinction between three-fold reality, resembling Nitecki's conceptualizations: procedural, empirical ('functional' in her terminology), conceptual, ideological and contextual, administrative. The functional, social-engineering dimension has "a mandate to develop effective methods and techniques to organize, control, store, and retrieve information."24 (This is ill ustrated by Lancaster's (1977) focus on maximization of the access to information.)
The conceptual, planning dimension aims at "the development of an approach . . . to identify and synthesize the wide variety of ideas, theories, and models about the nature of information . . . "25 (similar to Wright's (1977) emphasis on its metascientific character). The contextual, cultural dimension of librarianship focuses on "the nature of the social need it must mee t, and integrates theory and context to package services to meet that social need" (e.g., Shera's 'social epistemology').26
Horowitz's definitions of information also resemble in some cases the classification of the model proposed in this essay. She summarizes Levitan's (1982) view that information is "viewed as a cycle which includes the entire set of procedures, operations, and functions involved in the collection, evaluation, storage, retrieval, dissemination, and generation of information by a user."27
All this is based on the premises that: (1) information is a basic phenomenon, (2) it is perceived (3) as a semantic concept of a message, and is (4) differentiated from knowledge as its communicable form. In my model, those are the characteristics of data i.e., (1) given, (2) perceived, (3) ascribed, and when their description (information) is absorbed in a given system, (4) it becomes part of its knowledge.
10.5.2 Procedur al Level of Interpretation
10.5.2.1 Information as a Flow of Form (Young, 1987)
Young starts with the premise that the universe is a mass-energy system, and that the mind, as a part of that system, processes information. He defines information as a mass-energy form, since "every set or system of relations in the mass-energy universe constitutes a form of the universe, whether or not [it is] distinguishable as such to a given observer."28 He include d in that definition all mental events such as knowledge, emotions, volitions, consciousness, and mind itself, all viewed either as abstract information events, as flows of mass-energy forms, or as form-manipulating processes.
However, although all information is a form, the reverse is not always true, since they are many form processes that are not information. The distinction refers to two kinds of processes: morphological and kinetic. Information processes are relational and morphological, i n which kinetic, energetic aspects are secondary. Patterns defined as the characteristics of a form are the primary ingredients of information flow. Young illustrates the distinction by an example: "When we say that a neuron fires a given number of spikes per second and that this activity transmits information, we are not saying that the neuron is transmitting anything other than the pattern of its firing."29
The information is embodied in that pattern. Pattern means information that is preserved, while moved, in a transformation. Therefore any activity that involves communication of information preserves and transfers a form that is communicated, through a series of coding and recording processes. "At the most fundamental level, information flow can be defined as a relational-morphological, mass-energy activity involving representational (symbolic) form transfers between two or more mass-energy systems, a flow of form."30
A certain amount of energy is needed to communicate information, to preserve and transfer characteristics of a given form, i.e., its information, from one mass-energy system to another. The amount of energy is normally very small, within the limits, needed for its protection. Too little energy would prevent the transfer of the form, and too much of it would destroy the form itself.
As a relational process, not a form phenomenon, information flow can be identified without a specific frame of reference or context. As a relation al activity, information requires at least the sending and receiving of sets of mass-energy systems; it is not a content of either system, but a transmission of a pattern between them. The meaning of information, its value or significance, is explained in terms of resonance. "Resonance can be defined as the phenomenon that occurs when two or more oscillatory systems influence each other's activity."31
The interaction by resonance results in exchanging relational patterns, and th is, in turn, influences the pattern of the receiving system. As I pointed out elsewhere (Nitecki, 1989), Young attempts to develop an information model based on scientific, mechanistic premises, free from metaphysical speculations. His universe is a self-organizing and self-regulating system, consisting only of either objects such as forms, their shapes and structures, or processes represented by energy, a capacity to change. Information, as defined above, communicates changes between the systems. It bec omes indispensable yet together with the concept of energy, it remains an undefined phenomenon. Similarly, some other models in information science are based on the notion of information as a content not only of brain processes but also of its product, the physical record or electronic data. Their focus is on information as a behavior-changing process, while in librarianship the primary interest is in the understanding the behavior-driven needs of the patrons for the information. Crucial here is the definit ion of information as that which satisfies those needs. Young's model is an example of a procedural interpretation of information. The basic datum of the universe is a form, according to Young, "a fundamental, universal characteristic, an intrinsic and necessary consequence of the rationality of the mass-energy universe."32
Form is present in "every object and event. It is a true universal."33 In the physical systems, the form is a given [D1] in my model, as a "structure, shape, configuration, arrangement, order, organization, pattern, relations, and essential nature or indwelling cause or principles,"34 as illustrated by the wave characteristics of amplitude, wavelength, frequency, etc. The perceived data, [D2] in my model, recognize and transform patterns by the scanning mechanism in the nervous system, as illustrated by the irritability of protoplasm in its reaction to external stimuli.
Ascribed data, [D3] i n my model, provide for concept manipulation by abstracting on verbal and nonverbal levels through symbols and signs "created and used as a representation of an event or object, a process that in living organisms enables them to organize and manipulate internally the world of their perception."35
Each of the above kinds of data can be interpreted in my model procedurally, contextually, and conceptually. Procedural interpretation (Pd) is evident in all physical scien ces, e.g., in physics "matter and space are mutually interdependent manifestations of a single, whole system or process in which material particles are not distinct entities made of some separate stuff or substance moving through space, but are geometrical forms of or disturbances of the space-time continuum." 36
Contextual interpretation is based on "frame of reference in which any set of mass-energy relations exists . . . must be seen as absolutely essential to a deter mination of its actual form characteristics, and therefore to its identity."37 Likewise, information "cannot be identified in the absence of a context or frame of reference38
Conceptual interpretation focuses on the form as a relation. "It is the form (relations), whether semantic, syntactic, experimental, or contextual, of the elements of language, and not the matter of which they are constructed, from which the mind generates meaning; the physical symbols themselves embody no linguistic meaning."39
It is not, for example, the printed words in language, but the arrangements between them, which signifies their meaning. All three attributes of data identified in my model are also discussed by Young. Information is considered as a flow of mass-energy forms; the information-processing is evident, for example, in biological systems (e.g., single-celled animals' response to stimulation), conduction of electri cal excitation in nerve cells, and coded patterns in computers.
The phenomenon of relations is considered to be the only concept that can interpret "all structure, shape, configuration . . . all order, organization, arrangement, all pattern, and all form . . . as consisting of sets or systems of relations between constituents." 40
Finally, Young equates all data with information: Information is now a basic descriptive concept, not only in communicatio n theory, cybernetics, and computer sciences but also in . . . physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology . . . psychobiology . . . neuro-science, . . . electromagnetic field disturbances, sound waves, atomic excitations, and other physical phenomena, in the structure and function of chemical molecules, in the sensory activities and behavioral displays of animals, in the activities of neurons, nervous systems, and brains, and in the entire complex of psychological o r mental processes, so that all cognitive functions, including perception, knowledge, thought, learning and memory, as well as emotion, volition, consciousness, and the entire phenomenon of mind -- are all now generally characterized by scientists as information-processing activities.41
For data to become information, they must be, according to Young, specified with respect to some frame of reference or context; they must undergo some set of relat ions with at least one other (receiving) system; they must become represented by altered form characteristics within the receiving system; and they must fall within certain minima and maxima of energy intensity or value.42 This is in my model a process of infoscription.
10.5.2.2 Stonier proposes a theory of information based on the assumption "that information is a basic property of the universe [and] . . . like matter and energy [it] has physical reality."43 It "has existed long before the appearance of human beings . . . [and] arose the moment the universe began to organize itself."44
Similarly to Young, Stonier distinguishes between two interrelated categories of information: structural information (contained in a system) and kinetic information (transmitted, processed or transformed). It achieves meaning in the context of a given perceptor system, and in an advanced form it is called 'intelligence,' a concept which c an be extended from simple, proto-intelligence to the collective, global, human, and machine intelligence. "The emerging, ever more highly complex but integrated combination of human and machine intelligence will evolve into new, advanced forms of organization described as pure intelligence."45
Related to my model, in this theory the information is considered as an unspecified, assumed basic property of the universe [D], manifested either as a phenomenon of a given structure [P 3] or as a process [P1]. Another theory will have to be developed, to explain the leap from the concept of 'information' to that of 'intelligence.' Such a theory of information, Stonier admits, does not exist.
10.5.3 Contextual Level of Interpretation
10.5.3.1 Smalley and Plum (1982) discuss the concept of information indirectly in its broad sense of information skills in library research by reviewing contextual approaches to bibliographic instruction in the humanities a nd sciences. They define a contextual approach in terms of differences in the structures of the literature, the scholarships and the reference and access tools used in the two disciplines.
These differences illustrate the basically different data studied by each discipline, reflecting the proverbial 'two-cultures' syndrome. In the humanities the focus is on interpretative context of a particular work of art, such as, e.g., a poem or a painting, each considered a unique artistic experie nce, [D2] in my model; while in the sciences, the focus is on an experimental context in search of regularities in experience, based on the assumption of an independent universe, [D1] in my model. While the former data are perceived in terms of a humanist's own "personal, unique perceptions," the latter are discovered by the scientist's "close examination of regularities."46
The research process in the scholarship of the humanities aims at the justification of experiences, whi le in the sciences it aims at their explanation. The relationships studied in the humanities are between the products of human creativity and the artist's personality, social experiences, and forms of artistic expressions. In sciences the focus is on 'understanding relationships between patterns.' The product of humanistic infoscription is a particular work of art, "reflecting complexities of personality, social experience, and form of expression";47 that of scientific infoscription is a verifiable and reproducible pattern of regularities.
The phenomena of infoscriptions are in both disciplines a form of inquiries which originate in "distinctive conceptual structures, governed by what it means to understand in that area of knowledge"48 and affect the processes of research and the reporting of their results. In the humanities, the scholars combine a discipline-determined conceptual framework with personal, unique percepti ons.49 In the sciences "the scientist's work is discipline-determined, and the methods, the theoretical assumptions, and the types of questions pursued are those that science has judged worthy."50
In this essay the contextual infoscription distinguishes between the two different realities, [D1] & [D2] in metalibrary model, reflected in different phenomena, products, and relationships between them, thus accounting for the contextual approach to bibliograp hic instruction that reflects the interactive processes between the learner's personal capacities and cognitive structures of different disciplines. 51
10.5.3.2 Beagle's essay (1988) offers an interesting discussion of different levels of interpreting data about the universe. Responding to a lack of definitions of information, Beagle recommends Bohm's concept of wholeness 52 as a context for theory in library and information science. His distinction between the mechanistic worldview and the contextual holistic approach is extended in my model by introducing the third, the conceptual dimension. I separate the mechanistic approach (bio-physical) from the contextual or environmental (socio-psychological) approach, to account for the basic differences that were also pointed out by Bohm.
The conceptual dimension accommo dates Bohm's concept of knowledge incorporated in his contextual dimension as "an abstraction from the total flux . . . the ground both of reality and of our knowledge of this reality."54 The differences between his two--and my three--dimensional approaches are highlighted by Beagle's distinction between volumes (physical units, viewed mechanistically as collections of books in a library as a warehouse) and titles. The concept combines the abstract content of books wit h their knowledge, "a collective interface between humans and an abstract aggregate . . . referred to as 'knowledge' or 'information55 In my model, I distinguish between the physical carrier (volume), the human, contextual interaction, and the (Popperian) conceptual objective knowledge, the last two dimensions relate to Beagle's titles.56
10.5.4 Conceptual Level of Interpretation
10.5.4.1 Metaphysics of Information (Wright, 1977)
< /B> In the introduction to his study, Wright summarizes the argument that information can be a subject of philosophy, but not the object of science. He gives two reasons for his position: (a) information is a nonphysical entity, made up of spiritual structure and form, not of substance; and (b) the content of matter and "form, precisely qua form, cannot function as the direct object of science, which must have a physical referent (phenomenal base) in the material universe."57
Wright's argument is based on five assumptions, developed fully in his essay.
(1) The reasons and senses are completely different phenomena, and the human being is both: externally a material, sensory body, and internally a nonmaterial, thinking being. This distinction is reflected in the emergence of two basic philosophical systems, materialism, dealing with the nature and origin of the universe, and idealism, focusing on human life and conduct. Wright calls them mechus (materialistic, scientif
ic), and telus (humanistic idealistic) types of systems, which are synonymous with contemporary 'know-how' and 'know-what' approaches, respectively. Wright's main hypothesis is that librarians are idealists and librarianship is a metascience, since its subject matter derives "not from man and nature in an objective sense, but from human ideas, the human languages (both natural and artificial) and the human information processes."58
He follows Kaplan (1964) in the assumption that philosop
hy can be based either on order, structure, and form, or on substance and content. Librarianship, according to Kaplan and Wright, is centered on the human mind.
(2) Man is an informational being, and a human information system is the only possible philosophical interpretation of everything in terms of human culture. The informational system may be sensory, neural, or noetic, cognitive. Human intelligence is capable of translating unstructured form into specific, manageable form "either by disce rning or creating its material manifestations within the sensory ambience, or by manipulating its nonmaterial manifestations in some abstract system.59 This dual capacity of intelligence results in (a) a dual kind of truth, experiential, artistic and intellectual, and scientific; (b) two kinds of thinking, inductive, empirical and deductive, and theoretical; and (c) two ways of learning and teaching, direct, experimental and indirect in abstraction.
(3) Abstract form differs from its expression. Form, according to Plato, is the unexpressed, ideal, unchangeable pattern of things. Their ideal image is expressed in a communication system as a concrete but distorted material replica of that form. The distinction raised a philosophical question: "Does the unsensed world of form completely transcend the material world of senses (Plato), or is the former immanent within the latter (Aristotle)?"60
The answers to that question reflect either the humanistic and metaphysical, or the scientific and empirical viewpoints. Corollary thoughts and language should be differentiated from their expressions. Likewise, information is a form, meaning 'in-for-mation,' that is, "the production of form in to 'inform' someone is quite literally to 'create form in' him, and the sensory modes of communication are both ancillary to that possibility and the means of its achievement."61 This definition is contrasted with the interpretation of information by inf ormation scientists as a utilitarian, instrumental means toward some desired ends.
(4) Each form has informational properties. These properties serve as material means for expressing the ideas through two kinds of symbols: physical at rest, static, (e.g., writing) and physical in motion, kinetic (e.g., speech). The primary function of a kinetic symbol is to express sensory experiences and emotions, its secondary function is to reflect on them. The priorities are reversed in a static symbol, "w hich tends to filter out the instinctive and emotional elements of human expression in order to display its neotic factors in permanent relationships."62
(5) Every society depends on its informational system, which, in the form of a generic book, stores information for future use. Wright's metaphysical interpretation of information provides a conceptual dimension, which he further developed in his other writings. He argues strongly for a view of philosophy of librarianshi p which is based on a metaphysical distinction between empirical and conceptual approaches to the study of the field.
Wright has not yet published his overall philosophy of librarianship. However, the predominant theme in all his writings is the implications of the dichotomy between humanistic and scientific approaches to the study of reality. He distinguishes between the metaphysics of thought processes and their products on the one hand, and the physics of experienced existence, on the other.
In the course of the years of extensive writing on this duality he draws a sharp distinction between (a) information as the object of study incompatible with the scientific method (Wright, 1977); (b) psychophysical relationships between physical symbols and their symbolic referents (Wright, 1986); (c) artistic recognition of nonphysical structure and form and scientific description of physical substance and content (Wright, 1976-a); (d) the cultural idealism of individual cognition and cult ural materialism of observable patterns of behavior (Wright, 1981-a); (e) library substance (physical datum as a symbol) and its instruments (physical datum per se) (1979-a); and (f) a distinction between physical library operations and metaphysics of ideas about the reality (Wright, 1976-b).
Wright sees librarianship as an intellectual discipline studying knowledge itself, contrasted with empirical disciplines that use knowledge to study other things (Wright, 1984). It is not a subject-matter, but a way of finding subject-matters of interest to others (Wright, 1978). The focus in librarianship is on the communication of ideas, not on the transmission of signals (Wright, 1981-b).
Philosophy of librarianship, Wright argues, should be based on metaphysical beliefs about reality, epistemological explanations of these realities, and ethically determined actions in terms of these realities (Wright, 1982). It should reflect the holistic character of the discipline, its psychophysical unity o f immaterial realities (ideas) with physical realities (data) (Wright, 1988). However, "librarianship is a metaphysical technology of knowing based on philosophy (knowledge of subsistents); it is not a physical technology of action based on science (knowledge of existents). Librarianship . . . is the very antithesis of science as a knowledge system."63
10.5.4.2 The Propositional Approach to Information (Fox, 1983)
Fox starts with a notion that 'information' in information science is identical with the ordinary understanding of the term. Furthermore, he limits his study to the linguistic conveyance of information, specifically to the information carried by sentence.
Before discussing his own approach, Fox reviews other theories of information, in the context of what information is not. Shannon's classical mathematical theory of communication (Shannon, 1948) is restricted to the transmission of messages, not their interpretations, and hence it is irrelevant to what is involved in the informing and misinforming processes. Fox rejects Wersig's and Neveling's (1975) definition of information as reduction of uncertainty in communication, since information can exist without being used in such processes. Whittemore's and Yovits' (1973) definition of information as 'data of value in decision-making' is equally unacceptable. It is a reductive analysis, defining one concept in terms of another, without defining either. Fairthorne's (1965) recommendation to stop using the term 'information' altogether is viewed as an argument of a nominalist who did not prove the unreality of the phenomenon for which the term 'information' stands. Schreider's (1965) focus is on the effect of information on the 'belief-state' of the receiver of communication ('thesaurus') This, to Fox is a "truism that a statement T conveys information to some individual if the individual understands T and changes his or her belief-state on the basis of T,"64 without consi dering information content. And finally, Fox takes an objection to Belkin's and Robertson's (1976) concept of information as that which can change structured image or mental conception of what we perceive, without defining the notion of 'structure.' All the above examples, Fox argues, failed to represent the ordinary notion of information.
Fox's own approach to information treats of it in terms of a proposition. Although it is also a reductive analysis, a proposition is better understood than in formation; it expresses a certain viewpoint and is subject to truth verification. Hence information can be replaced by proposition: "any item or piece of information is (made up of) propositions."65
Proposition differs from both kinds of sentences, one standing for universals (e.g., yellowness), or describing instances of those universals (e.g., yellow). The former is refereed to as a 'type,' the latter as a 'token' sentence, and both are spatio-temporal entities. A proposit ion is neither. It is "what is asserted to be the case by (someone who writes or utters)" it. 66 Furthermore, proposition is not identical with the basic meaning of the sentence. Meaning may have different connotations, "what is understood to be the meaning of a sentence . . . ['basic' meaning] . . . is very different from what a person means in using the sentence . . . ['extended' meaning]...and from what the sentence means . . . ['contextual' meaning]."67
Only propositions, and not the meanings of the sentences, can be asserted to be true or false. The propositions are not the meanings of sentences, nor is information, although the meaning is more closely related to the latter. Fox realizes that the relationship between the two is not clear and is the subject of long-standing philosophical debate. He suggests, however, that part of that relationship is in the role that meaning performs as a mediator between sentences and propositions, "by virtue of which th e former are able to express the latter."68
Subject to the above clarification, Fox offers what he calls "the propositional analysis of information," based on the assumption that "the information carried by a set $ of sentences is the proposition p, where p is a conglomerate proposition expressed by a set $' of sentences appropriately associated with $."69 Both information and proposition are abstract, non-sentences, and identical, categories.
Fox admits the vagueness of the above definition but justifies it by a necessity to distinguish between information that may be contained in, transferred by, or conveyed to an individual by a sentence. The extend to which information may be contained in a sentence depends on the context in which the meaning of that sentence is used. Information transferred by sentences is always transferred to a specific individual. The extent of the transfer depends on that individual's interpretation of the information re ceived. Furthermore, the information "conveyed to some individual is in part dependent upon the previous beliefs of that individual and on what that individual comes to believe as a result of receiving and understanding a message."70 It depends on the extent to which the meaning of the content of the received information affected the belief-state of that individual. The next part of Fox's model, not discussed here, focuses on the issues of informing and misinforming, "namely that X informs (or misinforms) Y that P only if Y receives and understands a message expressing the proposition that P."71
In final analyses, the nature of information is defined by the relationships between the characteristics of the following components in Fox model;
(b) misinformation: "a truth condition will not have to be included in the analysis of 'inform,' while a falsity condition will have to be included in the analysis of 'missing form. '"73
(c) belief and truth: "belief is not essentially involved in the process of informing."74
(d) epistemic authority: "informing someone that P can only take place when the informant is in a position to know that P."75
This narrow focus excludes consideration of data (or information) as process or event: information as proposition is not a temporal entity, occurring "at a particular time or over some duration of time."77 It also excludes the notion of informa tion as a commodity or product; a distinction is made between type of information (universal) and its instance (token), which merely "contains or conveys information."78
Fox's description of information approximates that of data viewed as phenomena. It "need not be true . . . believed by anyone . . . need not originate with a reliable informant, but it must originate with someone in an appropriate position to know."79 And it is subject to specific circumstances (referred to by Fox as 'contextual factors'). The same information may be contained in more than one sentence, and its conveyance depends on the belief-state of the individuals involved, hence "the same set of sentences, used on a given occasion, may transfer different information to different individuals."80
10.6 The Concept of Continuity
A major characteristic of the redefined relationships among data, information, and knowledge is the conti nuity of these relations. A notion that initially knowledge is a passive reflection of given facts stored in our memory as a part of knowledge acquired in the past implies that the thought process consists of two seemingly contradictory, simultaneous phases: (a) the passive stage, of knowledge already acquired, and (b) the changing state of knowledge prompted by active, innovative thoughts (Uchenko, 1929).
The unifying aspect of this process may be explained by a concept of hierarchy of changes, in which an active entity is changing within an unchangeable, passive larger entity at that moment. The changing aspects of the process may be metaphorically compared to a frozen action on the movie film's single frames; while a transition from one moment to another, called by Uchenko a 'continuity,' is a continuous movement created by a series of single exposures on a film.
We can also identify similar relations between sensory perceptions of new discrete facts or events and a simulta neous conceptual integration of those individual perceptions into an already developed unifying system of previously perceived facts or events in one's own mind. The formal phase of this data-information-knowledge process is referred to as a cognition of concrete particulars; the latter is named a cognition of universal abstractions.
In the diagram, data (D) are defined as perceptions of some concrete particulars, such as properties of objects, or events that are observed as changes in a giv en span of time, or records of such facts or events. The process of correlating two or more of these data is a part of integrated data-information-knowledge processes, while the result of such integration is a new relation known (K).
An integrated datum (I) is interpreted as an assertion of a given relation between two or more relevant data (D). The relationship between the two sets of integrated data (I1, and I2) changes the existing relations within continuously evolving total relations kno wn. This interpretation follows Boulding's concept of an image 'build up as a result of all past experiences.'
FIG.10-3: Relationship between discreteness and continuity in the data-information-knowledge processes.81
The relationships between discrete and continuous aspects of perception in the data-information-knowledge processes (d-i-k) can be described as a continuous merging of one phase of perception ( sensory) into another (conceptual). The data-information sequences represent sensory perceptions of the concrete, external environment, the 'matter.'
An individual patron in a library, seeking information, is in fact looking for the discrete data about some specific aspects of that matter. Those data constitute building blocks in that patron's mind; the blocks of data are then interrelated within the previously acquired data. This stage of the data-information-knowledge process serves as a frame work in which new perceptions are interrelated within a continuously changing state of relations known as a cognition of universal abstracts.
The above model reinforces the general notion of data-information-knowledge as a continuous process of integrating newly received perceptions into previously established systems of relations. It is a transition from the passive state of knowledge, acquired in the past, to an active, newly formed state of relations (newly perceived ideas). The process consists of a continuous series of changing relations. The similarities among the data allow for the continuation of the process itself, while the differences in the relationships among them stimulate the changes in that process.
Three major levels of the continuum correspond to the three-dimensional concept of relations known.
(a) At the empirical level, the continuum provides for a pattern of changes within an organism exemplifying the 'whole-part' relations, "so that the plan of the whole
influences the very characters of the various subordinate organisms which enter into it" (Uchenko, 1929,
p.145).
(b) At the contextual level, the principle of continuity provides for a synthetic unity between two forms of changes within any organism: the preprogrammed, passively followed changes, and the original, actively initiated, creative changes of the organism. This synthesis provides uniformity of meaning in any culture; it is a kind of psychological reinforcement of a general social conformi
ty and cultural stability of the larger organism which is unchanged at any particular moment.
(c) At the conceptual level, the notion of continuity reflects the multiplicity of constantly changing interests of an individual, which brings the element of novelty into that individual's data-information-knowledge relationships, thus further stimulating the data-information-knowledge process itself. Therefore, the driving force in the d-i-k process at this level is human intellectual curiosity.
The empirical level of continuity provides for a unity of the process of changes in the 'whole-part' sense; the contextual aspect of continuity defines the condition for change, interpreted as a departure from the static, passive pattern; while the conceptual dimension of a continuum explains the reasons for the change (e.g., an intellectual curiosity, a novelty factor). Thus, continuity correlates various aspects of changing environment, reflecting the uniqueness of each individual member of that total en vironment. Similar concepts of data-information-knowledge processes are discussed by Otten (1970), Kochen (1969), Vinken (1982), and Bretz (1971).
According to those theories, information becomes a part of the human mind by a continuous interrelation of ideas identified and acquired empirically, described experimentally, and explained philosophically, each emphasizing a different aspect of the information-knowledge process.
10.6.1 Patterns of Communication
In a gen
erally understood pattern of communication between an individual and the environment the relationship itself is discussed at two levels.
(a) At the query level of inquiry-initiated activity, an individual queries a particular segment of the environment for specific data.
(b) At the message level, an environment itself is considered as the originator of messages, responding to an individual's query.
The inquiry in the first stage, if made consciously, is determined by an individual's motivation for it, and the needs for data sought in terms of more or less clearly defined purpose for such an inquiry (e.g., 'why do I need certain data and what will I do with them, when I receive them?").
This model is not addressing an unconscious querying, that is, when a search for data is not defined, or when an inquirer is not actively seeking the data e.g., as in an exposure to an advertisement, although that aspect of the process can be incorporated into the second stage of the relations hip.
The need-purpose of the query may be one of the three primary types.
(a) The first of these is the search for a given single fact, series of facts, or events -- empirically identified, described, and measured ('factual data').
(b) The second consists of queries that are psychological in nature, engaging one's perceptive faculties in sizing up an environment.
(c) And the third is a philosophical search for an explanation of a meaning of certain environmental manifestations
(i.e., ideas or concepts about the environment).
Hence the first stage of the data-information-knowledge relations between an inquirer and environment can be symbolized as:
The whole sequence is referred to as a data-information-knowledge process of searching for needed data and for incorporating th em into new knowledge, by expanding or correcting the knowledge already possessed by an individual.
To summarize: the data-information-knowledge transfer involves three distinct phases: the inquirer's motivation, library's collection, and the inquirer's cognition of the content of selected records. The phases are connected by the query about the needed records, the message contained in them, and the feedback to the inquirer, either successfully completing the process, or continuing the search un til needed records are located.
The query consists of three interrelated processes:
(1) empirical inquiry about records (data),
(2) psychological perception of the information contained in the record, and
(3) philosophical cognition of its meaning.
The message of the selected record is contained in the record's carriers (commodity). As a datum, it is interpreted by the inquirer (behavioral reaction) as information, modifying his or her previous understanding of rea lity as new relations known (knowledge).
10.6.2 The impact of d-i-k Processes on Librarianship
The concept of data-information-processes may be useful to clarify some assumptions in the theory of librarianship, and to explain a changing focus in library practice. A model is based on a distinction between the objective sphere of matter, existing outside of the human mind, and a subjective sphere of perception of that matter by individual human beings in the form of thought s about that matter.
The process itself is relational, and it provides a mental link between the physical, real world, and a metaphysical world of ideas. In this sense, the continuity of the data-information-knowledge processes explains, at least in part, the dichotomy between the constantly changing content of recorded messages, and a relatively unchangeable structure of the communication process itself. That is, the ideas about the matter 'out there' change, but the mechanism for their develo pment remains the same. This model does not imply a form-content separation, it de-emphasizes that distinction. Form and content "are complementary terms: they have no meaning in isolation. But in conjunction they make up the meaningful form-content relation . . . The very essence of form is to be imposed on content, whereas the very essence of content is to be subject to form.82
This important point is often overlooked by the critics of metaphysical approaches to the theory o f librarianship. The opposition between form and content 'is not equivalent to the dualism of the ideal and the real . . . [but it is] functional and relative to a certain context . . . in a different context a term which used to be a form may turn out to be a content.83
Fig. 10-4 summarizes Uchenko's eloquent discussion of the form-content relations. The focus on either the form or a content in librarianship affects the approaches of the users of libr ary material. It is not an issue of building separate theories for ideal and real worlds, since both, form and content, reflect each of the two worlds. In the context of a material world, the form is represented by empirically described data, while the content of those data is expressed by scientifically described relations between those data and their explanations. In the context of ideas, the form is made of individual thoughts, interrelated in an abstract universe of a philosophical discourse.
In both, the emotive aesthetic and the experimental scientific data-information-knowledge processes, the content of the process is determined by the form of a particular medium of expression, or by the message contained in the carrier of information. In the philosophical, reflective data-information-knowledge process, it is the form, the platonic essence, that is expressed by various content manifestations.
FIG.10-4: Form - Content Interrelations. 84
The model of the data-information-knowledge process may also contribute to a better understanding of the conditions necessary for the fulfilment of the library mission to assist the patron in obtaining needed material. As the model suggests, personal knowledge is subjective, always directly related to an individual's own previous knowledge and unique way of absorbing new perceptions into an existing system of relations already known. As I have said at the beginning o f this chapter, all that the library can do is to provide its patron with the records available in the library collection. It is up to individual users of that collection to relate the content of the retrieved material to their own needs. Hence, the role of a librarian is to provide an environment required by patrons for their own data-information-knowledge process.
For those reasons, the traditional reference function of providing specific answers to more or less specific questions must be expanded to allow users to develop their own thoughts rather than merely to familiarize themselves with the thoughts of others. Librarians qua librarians will have to expand their role as consultants by evaluating the quality of the text given to the patron. The issue is avoided by librarians now in order not to prejudice library patrons.
This brings up even more complex issue of cognitive authority, viewed by Wilson in terms of professional skeptics questioning the quality of the mat erial claims to knowledge, without declaring their own preference (Wilson, 1983).
In the final analysis it is a personal knowledge that matters in librarianship, a knowledge that is defined as a subjective, ever-changing state of mind, a result of continuous personal data-information-knowledge processes. The practical consequences of subscribing to the concept of continuous information-knowledge processes are evident in a newly emerging emphasis on the process of making library material availabl e to the user.
It is a shift in emphasis from a concentration on collection of physical carriers of information and knowledge to a more aggressive development of the intellectual access to these collections. This change is evident in the emphasis on resource-sharing and network approaches to library collections and services.
Modern librarianship goes beyond the task of arranging and classifying the library material; it also develops methods of relating the content. A phenomenal expan sion of information retrieval services and the role of the computer will have enormous impact on librarianship in its capacity to interrelate various recorded data-information-knowledge processes to meet the unique needs of individual patrons.
The stereotypes of a material- or user-oriented librarian will merge into those of data-information-knowledge process-oriented consultant. The reality of the material world is existential in nature. Its perception is selective and subjective, responding to external stimulation, or it is initiated by one's own intellectual curiosity. Its comprehension is always relative to previously absorbed perceptions, interwoven into a system of personal relations known at any one time. This is the essence of the data-information-knowledge continuum, the major component of the metalibrary intellectual environment.
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of the Symposium on Education for Information Science .
Washington, D.C.: Spartan Books, p. 10.
19. Wersig, G. and Urlich Neveling (1975), op. cit.
20. The essays were arbitrarily selected as illustrations for the
model suggested in this paper. None, of course, was written
with this model in mind, and therefore the quo
tations
extracted from them may be out of intended context. However,
as quoted, they provide good examples for the infoscriptive
processes suggested in the model.
21. Otten, K. W. (1974). "Basis for a Science of Information." In
A. Debons (ed.), Information Science ; Search for Identity .
Marcel Dekker, p. 95.
22. Ibid., p. 96.
23. Horowitz, R. G. de (1988). Librari
anship ; A Third World
Perspective . New York: Greenwood Press, p. 50.
24. Ibid., p. 118.
25. Ibid., p. 114.
26. Ibid., p. 117.
27. Ibid., p. 94.
28. Young, P. (1987). The Nature of Information . New York:
Praeger. p. 52.
29. Ibid., p. 61.
30. Ibid., p. 66
31. Ibid
., p. 80.
32. Ibid., p. 52.
33. Ibid., p. 33.
34. Ibid., p. 46.
35. Ibid., p. 99.
36. Ibid., p. 34.
37. Ibid., p. 55.
38. Ibid., p. 75.
39. Ibid., p. 43.
40. Ibid., p. 47-48
41. Ibid., p. 1-2.
42. Ibid
., p. 77.
43. Stonier, T. (1991). "Towards a New Theory of Information."
Journal of Information Science , 17, p. 257.
44, Ibid., p. 258.
45. Ibid., p. 262.
46. Smalley, T. N., and S. H. Plum (1982). "Teaching Library
Researching in the Humanities and the Sciences: A Contextual
Approach." In C. Oberman, & K. Strauch (ed.), Theories of
Bibliographic Education . New Yo
rk: R. R. Bowker, p. 138-139.
47. Ibid., p. 138.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., pp. 138-139.
50. Ibid., p. 141.
51. Ibid., p .158.
52. The concept of wholeness is defined by Bohm as the implicate
order of the holomovement, "a multidimensional reality whose
totality is immeasurable and undefinable because we ourselves
and our processes
of knowing are enfolded within it."
Beagle, D. (March 1988). "Libraries and the 'Implicate
Order': A Contextual Approach to Theory." Libri , 38(1),
p. 33.
53. Bohm, D. (1980). Wholeness and the Implicate Order . London:
Ark Paperbacks, p. 173. (also quoted by Beagle, 1988, pp. 32-
33).
54. Beagle, 1988, op. cit., p. 31.
55. Ibid., p. 34.
56. Note also his comme
nt on the use of nouns and verbs in
definitions of information. "The fact that we thus use nouns
to name actions or processes more appropriately described by
verbs may partly explain why such nouns have proven resistant
to unambiguous definition" (Beagle, 1988, pp. 31-32).
57. Wright, H. Curtis (1977). The Oral Antecedents of Greek
Librarianship . Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press.
Foreword by Jesse H. Shera; Afterword by H
. J. de Vlees-
chauwer, p. xv.
58. Ibid., p. 9.
59. Ibid., p. 11.
60. Ibid., p. 23.
61. Ibid., p. 31.
62. Ibid., p. 34.
63. Wright, H.Curtis. "The Wrong Way to Go." Journal of American
Society for Information Science , 30(2). March, 1979, p. 74.
64. Fox, C. J. (1983). Information and Misinfor
mation ; An
Investigation of the Notions of Information , Misinformation ,
Informing and Misinforming . Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, p. 70.
65. Ibid., p. 91.
66. Ibid., p. 77.
67. Ibid., p. 83.
68. Ibid., p. 96.
69. Ibid., p. 98.
70. Ibid., p. 102.
71. Ibid., p. 109.
72. Ibid., p. 116.
73. Ibid., p. 160.
74. Ibid., p. 168.
75. Ibid., p. 179.
76. Ibid., p. 25.
77. Ibid., p. 31.
78. Ibid., p. 34.
79. Ibid., p. 212.
80. Ibid., p. 101.
81. Nitecki, 1985, op. cit. , p. 394.
82. Uchenko, A. P. (1969).
The Logic of Events; An Introduction
to a Philosophy of Time. In G. P. Adams et al. (ed.),
University of California Publications in Philosophy . New
York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, p. 73.
83. Ibid.
84. Nitecki, 1985, op. cit., p. 400.
Metalibrarianship
Table of Contents
Summary of Chapters
Chapters:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Models
Appx
Refs